IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperación condicional y tercer sector


  • Juan de Dios Montoro Pons

    () (Universitat de València)


The following paper analyzes the problem of social cooperation in the provision of a public good from an evolutionary perspective. To this end we depart from behavioral programs as the basic building block for modeling individuals in the social interaction, which is based on a generalized prisoners dilemma. In it, a population of individuals follow a conditional cooperative program, which some authors refer as to morality, and that we will show that is equivalent to the application of the principle of reciprocity. It will be shown that the degree of cooperation, that is the individual contribution toward the provision of the public good, is positive although sub-optimal. Finally, if we compare the rationality of the moral program with respect to other behavioral programs, it is individually payoff-consistent. Based on these results we may conclude that part of the nonprofit sector may well be based on conditional cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan de Dios Montoro Pons, 2000. "Cooperación condicional y tercer sector," CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa, CIRIEC-España, issue 36, pages 79-96, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cic:revcir:y:2000:i:36:p:79-96

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Rationality; morality; prisoners dilemma; cooperation; public goods.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cic:revcir:y:2000:i:36:p:79-96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rafael Chaves). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.