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Cooperación condicional y tercer sector

Listed author(s):
  • Juan de Dios Montoro Pons


    (Universitat de València)

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    The following paper analyzes the problem of social cooperation in the provision of a public good from an evolutionary perspective. To this end we depart from behavioral programs as the basic building block for modeling individuals in the social interaction, which is based on a generalized prisoners dilemma. In it, a population of individuals follow a conditional cooperative program, which some authors refer as to morality, and that we will show that is equivalent to the application of the principle of reciprocity. It will be shown that the degree of cooperation, that is the individual contribution toward the provision of the public good, is positive although sub-optimal. Finally, if we compare the rationality of the moral program with respect to other behavioral programs, it is individually payoff-consistent. Based on these results we may conclude that part of the nonprofit sector may well be based on conditional cooperation.

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    Article provided by CIRIEC-España in its journal CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa.

    Volume (Year): (2000)
    Issue (Month): 36 (December)
    Pages: 79-96

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    Handle: RePEc:cic:revcir:y:2000:i:36:p:79-96
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