Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model
This article proposes a methodology to attack the problem of considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long term results for bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application of the model
Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
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