L'abus de pouvoir de marché: contrôle de la domination ou protection de la concurrence ?

The main ASCOLA?s aim is to focus on theorical foundations in EU competition law, with a comparative law perspective. This methodological draft has to be connected with measuring the variable influence of economic theories on competition law. As well as in Germany, France, EU, judicial decisions are slowly building a « European competition order » which is every day more and more complete and, most of all, more complicated. It is generally considered as the opposite model of United States of America?s one. In this very complex material, ASCOLA?s hypothesis is that, started from USA, an evolution is implemented slowly which shifts the traditional competition law from controlling competition restrictions to protect competition, and even to construct competition. Broadly, the evolution has been characterized by a shift from the traditional antitrust control over restrictions of competition to a « regulatory» approach 102 . This evolution has to be linked to the different approaches of competition law and, most of all, to the different approaches of law and economics. Competition law is, and it is necessary to focus on this, a major part of public policies. Public policies can?t be submitted to economic abstract models. They include social, contractual, consumer, environmental concerns in Europe, which seem totally excluded from the new and « modern» competition law. This is a really concern which every lawyer is interested. More precisely, « strict» competition law invites all of us around an important debate in which different theories are sollicitated. We would like to answer as objectively as possible about a subject, which cannot be totally objective. As A. Pirovano noticed several years ago, competition law has to combine several fragmentary and fragile balances between competition freedom, contract freedom, property right. All theses concerns must be crossed with economic competition, competition law and competition politics.