La différence de taille comme obstacle à la coopération fiscale horizontale entre collectivités locales

The subject of this paper is to study, thanks to a tax competition model (with tax rates fixation and response of the capital) the ability of local governments to be engaged in tax cooperation when they differ significatively in size. We?ll study cooperative and non ? cooperative choices of local governments as their consequences when the strategical variable is a tax rate on mobile capital. We?ll wonder if a town will spontaneously tend to tax cooperate with a suburban locality and conversely. We?ll assume that local governments are benevolent : their main goal is to maximize the social welfare of their residents. In fact, we try to explain the genesis of the French « Intercommunalité » : tax consolidation between localities. In other words, we give theoretical reasons for the creation of tax cooperation organizations by the French public authorities intended to localities during the second half of the last century. Classification JEL : H2, H4, H7.