IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation

  • Claire Naiditch
  • Radu Vranceanu

This paper analyses the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor supply of left-home residents. The model is cast as a game between the migrant and the resident, where the former has only an imperfect information about the true economic situation of the latter. The optimal amount of remittances depends on wages of both agents. In the hybrid equilibrium of the game, some rich residents may behave as if they were poor only in order to manipulate remitters? expectations. Being aware of this risk, migrants reduce the amount of remittances accordingly. Poor residents can implement a costly signaling strategy of hour supply reduction, right when their economic situation is the worst.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REDP_184_0513
Download Restriction: free

File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2008-4-page-513.htm
Download Restriction: free

Article provided by Dalloz in its journal Revue d'économie politique.

Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 513-540

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_184_0513
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique.htm

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_184_0513. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.