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Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation


  • Claire Naiditch
  • Radu Vranceanu


This paper analyses the impact of remittances sent by altruistic migrants on the labor supply of left-home residents. The model is cast as a game between the migrant and the resident, where the former has only an imperfect information about the true economic situation of the latter. The optimal amount of remittances depends on wages of both agents. In the hybrid equilibrium of the game, some rich residents may behave as if they were poor only in order to manipulate remitters’ expectations. Being aware of this risk, migrants reduce the amount of remittances accordingly. Poor residents can implement a costly signaling strategy of hour supply reduction, right when their economic situation is the worst.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Naiditch & Radu Vranceanu, 2008. "Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(4), pages 513-540.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_184_0513

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    remittances; perfect bayesian equilibrium; labor supply; signaling; altruism;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration


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