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Le rôle des garanties dans les prêts des banques françaises

Author

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  • Régis Blazy
  • Laurent Weill

Abstract

This paper provides new empirical evidence on the reasons why French banks use collateral. We test the relevance of the reduction of loan loss in the event of default and the resolution of adverse selection problems as satisfactory reasons for this use. We use a dataset of 564 bank loans on French firms, which contains the full information on type and value of collaterals. We then show that collateral reduces loan loss in the event of default with major differences between collaterals in terms of magnitude of the reduction. Furthermore our results reject the view that collateral would help to solve adverse selection problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Régis Blazy & Laurent Weill, 2006. "Le rôle des garanties dans les prêts des banques françaises," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(4), pages 501-522.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_164_0501
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    Cited by:

    1. Cyril Pouvelle, 2012. "Bank Credit, Asset Prices and Financial Stability; Evidence From French Banks," IMF Working Papers 12/103, International Monetary Fund.

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    Keywords

    bank; collateral; information asymmetries;

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