La sécurité de l'approvisionnement électrique. Quels enjeux pour la régulation ?
The volatility in electricity markets disrupts price signals for investors and could induce an insufficient level of generating capacity. The risks are all the more significant since the profitability of peak-load capacities is especially sensitive to the level of prices that are realised during the small number of hours in which they produce energy. But, the difficulty to balance between scarcity rents and abuses of market power could induce regulatory interventions as too stringent price-caps. These ones could make worse the spontaneous market under-investment. They restrict the scarcity rents expected by the investors and reinforce the law uncertainty. Our purpose is to analyse the mechanisms which are used to provide an optimal level of generating capacity, as capacity obligations, payments or markets, and to underline the complementarities between decentralised investment decisions and public action. JEL codes: K23, L43, L94.
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