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Dilemme en action motrice et robustesse de la stratégie évolutionnairement stable


  • Luc Collard
  • Alexandre Obœuf
  • Marc Legrand


In a game of evolution solved by the motor action, the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ess) is robust? Fifty-six student athletes participate in the game Hawks versus Doves. The each play five times. Two players are at the same distance from a balloon. They secretly choose a jersey, different color for dove and hawk. At the signal, everyone tries to bring the ball into this camp. Players use the techniques of rugby for hawk and the techniques of basketball for dove. The ess invites theoretically choose hawk 7 out of 12. Of the 140 tournaments, the players (25) who have played the Nash equilibrium have not maximized their gains. This is due to the motor relevance of the game. Players away from the ess show a different logic based on their dynamic possibilities of intervention in conjunction with the characteristics of the other players. Classification JEL : C72, C88, C93

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Collard & Alexandre Obœuf & Marc Legrand, 2012. "Dilemme en action motrice et robustesse de la stratégie évolutionnairement stable," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 63(4), pages 795-808.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_634_0795

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jean-François Laslier, 1999. "La norme majoritaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(4), pages 669-698.
    2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00613191 is not listed on IDEAS
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments


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