Une analyse microéconomique du gage patrimonial dans l'aide aux personnes dépendantes
This paper examines the possible reform of the system of aid to dependent individuals (apa), a reform aimed at recovering the subsidies awarded from the individual?s bequest. We develop a theoretical model with a dependent parent and an offspring that can potentially act as informal carer. The parent decides how much formal aid to buy, while the offspring decides how much informal care to provide to her parent. The model is solved for three cases: no altruism, altruism from bequests (towards a surviving spouse or offspring), and altruism towards the parent. We show that recovering the subsidy from the bequest increases the amount of informal aid supplied by a non-altruist offspring, while the versions with altruism yield ambiguous results. Classification JEL : D11, D3
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_632_0339. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.