IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fonction de popularité, hypothèse de responsabilité et dynamique des partis. Le cas français


  • Christophe Boya
  • Julien Malizard
  • Emin Agamaliyev


This note looks at the popularity of the executive (Prime Minister and President of the Republic) and parties of power (ump and ps) in France. The aim is twofold: on the one hand to test the influence of economic, socio-economic and politic variables on the popularity of Prime Minister and the President to know who is most responsible and secondly to know the dynamics of power?s parties. Our results show that the newly introduced variables are significant and confirm the greater sensitivity of the popularity of Prime Minister vis-?-vis the economic deteriorations compared to that of the President of the Republic. However, if the ruling party also appears to be responsible, the opposition party does not take advantage of the deteriorating economic conditions. Classification JEL : C30, D72

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Boya & Julien Malizard & Emin Agamaliyev, 2010. "Fonction de popularité, hypothèse de responsabilité et dynamique des partis. Le cas français," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(5), pages 859-873.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_615_0859

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: free


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Auberger, 2015. "The impact of economic and political factors on popularity for France (1981-2014)," Working Papers halshs-01264983, HAL.
    2. Antoine Auberger, 2020. "The impact of economic and political factors on popularity for France (1981- 2017)," Working Papers hal-02501677, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_615_0859. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.