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Risque nucléaire civil et responsabilité optimale de l'exploitant


  • André Schmitt
  • Sandrine Spaeter


The civil liabiliy of nuclear operators are regulated by two sets of international Conventions. In particular, strict liability, limited financial responsibility and the obligation of providing financial guaranties are imposed to the nuclear operator by the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention. Then national legislations are free to increase the financial cap of responsibility fixed by the international regimes. First we present the main elements of these Conventions. Then we focus on the impact of a modification in the amount of responsibility of the nuclear operator on his risk mitigation policy and on his financial condition. In particular we show that an increase of the cap beyond a given level determined by the model gives the operator some incentives to lessen the investment in prevention, contrary to what is expected. Besides, the impact of the preventive activities done by the firm on its financial constraint depends on the sensitivity of the risk distribution to the variation of the prevention level: The risk mitigation activities must be discussed with respect to the severity of the incidents and/or to the size of the nuclear park. Classification JEL : D82, K32, Q4, D62.

Suggested Citation

  • André Schmitt & Sandrine Spaeter, 2007. "Risque nucléaire civil et responsabilité optimale de l'exploitant," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(6), pages 1331-1351.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_586_1331

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
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    9. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    10. William E. Kovacic & Petros C. Mavroidis & Damien J. Neven, 2014. "Merger control procedures and institutions: A comparison of the EU and US practice," IHEID Working Papers 01-2014, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Veronique Thireau, 2011. "Economie du nucléaire et contentieux," Post-Print hal-01221360, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities


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