Taxation optimale de la consommation et biens informels
The question of this paper is whether it is worth taxing the black market. A theoretical optimal tax model provides a first analytical discussion. An empirical version allows us to estimate an optimal tax system for Madagascar. For reasonable inequality aversion parameters, the taxation?s rate of the informal goods is always quite beside the formal goods?one. Nevertheless, efficiency criteria lead to tax informal goods above the actual rates. In opposition, informal goods could be optimally subsidised for higher inequality aversion parameters. Classification JEL : H21, H26
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