Code de gouvernance et gestion des résultats comptables : le cas des sociétés françaises cotées

Corporate governance codes, including a set of voluntary recommendations, have been developed around the world as a result of successive financial crises and scandals. To date, the question of their effectiveness remains largely open and debated in the international context. The objective of the article is to study the influence of compliance with a governance code on earnings management in France. This issue arises especially after the introduction of the DDAC law (2008), which provides for French listed companies the reference to a governance code according to the ?comply or explain? principle. The results of the study show that companies in the SBF120 index have progressively increased their compliance with the code over the period (2006-2013). Moreover, compliance (and the evolution of this compliance) is negatively associated with accrual and real earnings management. The requirements of the code relating to the board of directors and its committees seem to limit earnings management, whereas the requirements relating to executives and their remuneration have no effect on earnings management. These results seem to confirm the positive impact of governance code on earnings quality.