Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions
Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from more to less vulnerable victims. When this shift is substantial, augmented sanctions exacerbaterather than reducethe risk to vulnerable victims. Based on this insight, this article suggests several normative implications concerning the efficacy of enhanced sanctions, the importance of victims funds, and the connection between police operations and apprehension rates.
Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:3:y:2007:i:2:n:9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.