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Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note

Author

Listed:
  • Cassone Alberto

    (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy)

  • Marchese Carla

    (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy)

Abstract

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassone Alberto & Marchese Carla, 2006. "Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 193-208, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:2:y:2006:i:2:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1035
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    Cited by:

    1. dos Santos, Marcelo Rodrigues, 2009. "Labor Supply, Criminal Behavior and Income Redistribution," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 29(2), December.

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