IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v2y2006i2n2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note

Author

Listed:
  • Cassone Alberto

    (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy)

  • Marchese Carla

    (University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy)

Abstract

Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassone Alberto & Marchese Carla, 2006. "Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 193-208, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:2:y:2006:i:2:n:2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2006.2.2/rle.2006.2.2.1035/rle.2006.2.2.1035.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 117-136, January.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:sbe:breart:v:29:y:2009:i:2:a:3441 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:2:y:2006:i:2:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.