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Switching Roles in Experiments: Learning in a Signaling Game

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  • Solomon Michael

    (Department of Economics, 8439 Colby College , Waterville, ME 04901, USA)

Abstract

In games of asymmetric information, it can be difficult for subjects to understand the true position of their opponents. Theoretically, they should be able to take the information they are given and reason through their opponent’s options, but in practice this could be quite demanding. A potential solution to this problem is to allow subjects to switch roles, thereby gaining an understanding of the other side of the table. In this paper, I look at the effect of role switching on the learning process in a simple signaling game of pretrial bargaining. My findings are mixed: role switching appears to help Subjects reduce some kinds of mistakes, but it also exacerbates other mistakes.

Suggested Citation

  • Solomon Michael, 2026. "Switching Roles in Experiments: Learning in a Signaling Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(4), pages 865-884.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:21:y:2026:i:4:p:865-884:n:1005
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2024-0065
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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