IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence

Listed author(s):
  • Rizzo Mario J.

    (New York University)

Registered author(s):

    Nous proposons dans cet article un développement de lidée proposée par F.A. Hayek selon laquelle lordre du droit coutumier est un ordre daction, une coordination des plans individuels dans un système déchange régi par ce droit. Cette conception soppose à lidée suivant laquelle lordre légal doit être avant tout fondé sur la cohérence logique des concepts et doctrines de ce droit. Un exemple important de cette approche est celui de la structure de maximisation des richesses de William Landes et Richard Posner. Larticle montre que la cohérence logique nest ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour un ordre de plans ou pour une cohérence praxéologique. Nous défendons la position du droit coutumier classique suivant laquelle le droit se développe en accord avec les anticipations marginales des parties en présence. Dans la mesure où le droit se développe dans ce sens, il est possible dapprocher des objectifs jumelés du droit coutumier : la certitude relative et ladaptation aux circonstances particulières.This article is a development of the idea, proposed by F.A. Hayek, that the order of common law is an order of actions, that is, a coordination of the plans of individuals in a system of exchanges governed by that law. This is in contrast to the idea that legal order is primarily to be found in the logical coherence of the laws doctrines and concepts. (An important example of the latter approach is the wealth-maximization framework of William Landes and Richard Posner.) The article shows that logical coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for an order of plans, or praxeological coherence. It argues for the classic common law position that the law develops in accordance with the marginal expectations of the relevant parties. To the extent that the law develops in this way, it is possible for the twin goals of the common law to be approximated: relative certainty and adaptation to novel circumstances.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines.

    Volume (Year): 9 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 1-16

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:9:y:1999:i:4:n:1
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    in new window

    1. Mario Rizzo, 1985. "Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 4(3), pages 865-896, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:9:y:1999:i:4:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.