IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and Litigation in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking

Listed author(s):
  • Schmidt Patrick

    (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and Nuffield College, University of Oxford)

Registered author(s):

    Administrative agencies in the United States have developed highly formalized and complex processes for public participation in rulemaking, especially in areas of social regulation such as the environment and workplace safety and health. This case study considers the significance of participation in formal rulemaking processes by connecting the quality of participation to the strategic possibilities in litigation between private interests and regulatory agencies. Specifically, the strategic possibilities of the leading interest groups engaged in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's major "Lockout/Tagout" rulemaking illustrate how legal resources are created through the development of evidence and claims in hearings. Written and oral presentations, apparently aimed directly at persuading the agency, indirectly affect agency deliberations by increasing the possibility that courts will constrain agency decisionmaking, thus creating opportunities for negotiated alternatives. The case ultimately serves as a paradigmatic example of how bargaining arises at the micro level of policy systems that are infused with broader legal structures.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 1-20

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:1:n:3
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:1:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.