IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/vtopics.6y2006i1n6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Das Satya P

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)

  • Lahiri Sajal

    (Southern Illinois University Carbondale)

Abstract

This paper develops a model of terrorist activity and behavior. A terrorist organization chooses the size and the number of attacks. The defending state chooses the level of security-deterrence measures. The equilibrium sequence is such that the Organization moves first, followed by the State. A defensive policy such as an innovation in security-deterrence technology tends to reduce the size of attacks but increase their number, while an offensive policy, lowering the total "strike" or "output" potential of a terrorist organization, has opposite effects. Both policies reduce the expected damage from terror. An individual's decision to become a terrorist or a financier is also modeled, leading to endogenous supplies of terrorists and funds. The effects of terrorist-flushing measures, provisions to curb the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and income-enhancing policies are evaluated by taking into account their "supply-side" effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Das Satya P & Lahiri Sajal, 2006. "A Strategic Analysis of Terrorist Activity and Counter-Terrorism Policies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1295
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1295
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1534-598X.1295?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2023. "The Trade-Offs of Counterterrorism Policies," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 105(3), pages 177-197, July.
    2. Satya P. Das & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2008. "Deterrence, preemption and panic: A Common-enemy problem of terrorism," Discussion Papers 08-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    3. Nicola, Brugali & Paolo, Buonanno & Mario, Gilli, 2018. "Political Regimes and the Determinants of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism," Working Papers 384, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jul 2018.
    4. Satya P. Das & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2014. "Deterrence, Preemption, And Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem Of Terrorism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 219-238, January.
    5. Satya P. Das & Sajal Lahiri, 2021. "Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 416-445, December.
    6. Mario Gilli & Paolo Tedeschi, 2020. "European Union and Transnational Terrorism. A Normative Analysis of Strategic Spillovers," Working Papers 437, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2020.
    7. Thomas Gries & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'," Working Papers CIE 95, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    8. Hamid Mohtadi & Bryan S. Weber, 2021. "Catastrophe And Rational Policy: Case Of National Security," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 140-161, January.
    9. Gries, Thomas & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' '- Compromise for Peace versus Conventional, Guerilla, or Terrorist Warfare," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145617, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Das, Satya P., 2008. "Some mechanisms of terror cycles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 644-656, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.