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Social Efficiency of Free Entry in a Vertically Related Industry with Cost and Technology Asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Chen Ding

    (School of Economics and Management, Xi’an Shiyou University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China)

  • Wu Di

    (School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin, China)

  • Cao Hang

    (School of Business Administration, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, China)

  • Wang Leonard F. S.

    (Asia Pacific Research Foundation, Kaohsiung, Taiwan)

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of cost and technology asymmetry on social efficiency in a vertically related industry. If production costs for final goods are asymmetric and technology is symmetric, and if the entrant’s cost is moderate, then downstream entry is socially insufficient, regardless of whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale. Extending the analysis to asymmetric production technologies and symmetric cost, we show that the issue of socially insufficient entry persists. Thus, anti-competitive entry regulations should account for cost and technology asymmetries among competing firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Ding & Wu Di & Cao Hang & Wang Leonard F. S., 2025. "Social Efficiency of Free Entry in a Vertically Related Industry with Cost and Technology Asymmetry," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 25(3), pages 665-679.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:25:y:2025:i:3:p:665-679:n:1007
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2024-0280
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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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