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Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems

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  • Fabrizio Carmignani

Abstract

Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Carmignani, 2001. "Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(3), pages 313-329, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:48:y:2001:i:3:p:313-329
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00201
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    Cited by:

    1. Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2017. "Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 340, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Brams,S.L. & Kaplan,T.R., 2002. "Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 340, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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