Price Ceilings and Imperfect Competition
The effects of price ceilings on market equilibrium are traditionally analyzed either in terms of a competitive or monopolistic environment. In this paper, simple diagrammatic models of the effects of price ceilings are presented under Cournot oligopoly, with and without free entry. In both cases, the models suggest that ceilings can raise output as well as lower price but that the impact is not monotonic. These results accord more closely to the benchmark case of monopoly than to competition. Policy issues in the application of price ceilings are discussed in terms of the example of private rented housing. Copyright 1995 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 42 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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