Free Entry, Quasi-free Trade, and Strategic Export Policy
This paper analyzes governments' choices between strategic export subsidies and free trade as a commitment when firms are free to enter or exit in response to these choices. Entry and exit is treated as a discrete process. Within the context of a four-stage game, two types of equilibria emerge: a quasi-free-trade equilibrium in which one of the two governments commits to free trade, while the other has a Nash equilibrium subsidy that is zero and bilateral export subsidies. Concerning welfare effects, if fixed costs are large enough, both countries achieve a welfare gain relative to free trade. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 5 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0965-7576|