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Bildung und Innovation


  • Ludger Wöessmann


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  • Ludger Wöessmann, 2008. "Bildung und Innovation," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(s1), pages 1-4, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:9:y:2008:i:s1:p:1-4

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes, 2008. "School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 303-328, September.
    2. Braun Sebastian & Dwenger Nadja & Kübler Dorothea, 2010. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, March.
    3. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-1652, September.
    4. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    5. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    6. Federico Echenique & Alistair J. Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2016. "Clearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), pages 449-482, July.
    7. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    8. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 148-156, May.
    9. repec:pit:wpaper:487 is not listed on IDEAS
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