IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Equity–Efficiency Optimizing Resource Allocation: The Role of Time Preferences in a Repeated Irrigation Game


  • Bjorn Van Campenhout
  • Ben D'Exelle
  • Els Lecoutere


type="main" xml:id="obes12058-abs-0001"> We study repeated water allocation decisions among small scale irrigation users in Tanzania. In a treatment replicating water scarcity conditions, convexities in production make that substantial efficiency gains can be obtained by deviating from equal sharing, leading to an equity–efficiency trade-off. In a repeated game setting, it becomes possible to reconcile efficiency with equity by rotating the person who receives the largest share, but such a strategy requires a longer run perspective. Correlating experimental data from an irrigation game with individual time preference data, we find that less patient irrigators are less likely to use a rotation strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bjorn Van Campenhout & Ben D'Exelle & Els Lecoutere, 2015. "Equity–Efficiency Optimizing Resource Allocation: The Role of Time Preferences in a Repeated Irrigation Game," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 77(2), pages 234-253, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:77:y:2015:i:2:p:234-253

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:77:y:2015:i:2:p:234-253. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.