IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/manchs/v86y2018i5p665-680.html

The Countervailing Power Hypothesis when Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters

Author

Listed:
  • Noriaki Matsushima
  • Shohei Yoshida

Abstract

We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's disagreement payoff influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown in bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price. We also find that an increase in the number of fringe retailers is more likely to increase the retail price if their number is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Noriaki Matsushima & Shohei Yoshida, 2018. "The Countervailing Power Hypothesis when Dominant Retailers Function as Sales Promoters," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 86(5), pages 665-680, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:86:y:2018:i:5:p:665-680
    DOI: 10.1111/manc.12221
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12221
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/manc.12221?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shohei Yoshida, 2018. "Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 139-158, June.
    2. Yuta Kittaka & Noriaki Matsushima & Fuyuki Saruta, 2021. "Competition between physical and electronic content retailers," ISER Discussion Paper 1123, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    3. Qiu Zhao, 2019. "The Influence of Buyer Power on Supply Chain Pricing with Downstream Competition," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-19, May.
    4. Stephen Kelly & Daniel Chicksand, 2024. "A Critical Exploration of Bargaining in Purchasing and Supply Management: A Systematic Literature Review," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 617-646, June.
    5. Kittaka, Yuta & Matsushima, Noriaki & Saruta, Fuyuki, 2022. "Negative effect of price-matching policy on traditional retailers in a dual-channel supply chain with different content formats," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    6. Noriaki Matsushima & Shohei Yoshida, 2022. "The countervailing power hypothesis and contingent contracts," ISER Discussion Paper 1191, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:86:y:2018:i:5:p:665-680. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/semanuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.