Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts And Merger Incentives With Asymmetric Costs
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- Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2018.
"Firms Controlled by Owners and Managerial Firms: The 'Strategic' Trade Policy Game Revisited,"
Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 71(1), pages 51-72.
- Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2017. "Firms controlled by owners and managerial firms: the "strategic" trade policy game revisited," Discussion Papers 2017/215, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2018. "Bargaining over managerial contracts: a note," MPRA Paper 86143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2017. "Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(2), pages 189-209, August.
- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2017. "Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 83-119, March.
- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2011. "Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 49-89, September.
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