Short-Termism and Underinvestment: The Influence of Financial Systems
This paper contributes to the debate on the existence of short-termism in Anglo-Saxon financial systems. The authors focus on one aspect of short-termism, namely the conflict that can exist between shareholder-owners and managers. Adapting a dynamic model first presented by K. Lancaster (1973), they show that noncooperation between shareholders and managers in the division of profits leads to a suboptimal level of investment. Anglo-Saxon financial markets are characterized by short-term relationships between agents. The implication of the authors' model is that institutional reforms promoting more long-term, cooperative, relationships may provide one mechanism in alleviating short-termism. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/economics/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:manch2:v:63:y:1995:i:4:p:351-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.