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Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One‐Off Conflict

Author

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  • Anthony de Jasay
  • Werner Güth
  • Hartmut Kliemt
  • Axel Ockenfels

Abstract

Most social scientists' views of conflict and cooperation in society are shaped by very elementary, one‐off, two by two symmetric simultaneous move games like prisoner's dilemma, chicken, assurance or stag hunt. We think that this diet of examples leads to biased accounts in particular of distributional conflict, and therefore suggest that asymmetry in payoffs and move structure be taken into account systematically. In this paper a new paradigm of asymmetric games to study basic distributional conflicts is introduced, illustrated numerically and discussed theoretically. The results of exploratory experiments on the empirical side of the matter are also reported. Die sozialwissenschaftlichen Auffassungen von Konflikt und Kooperation in der Gesellschaft werden wesentlich von elementaren einmalig wiederholten symmetrischen 2 × 2‐Spielen mit simultan durchgeführten Zügen wie zwei Personen Gefangenen‐Dilemma, Chicken, Assurance oder Stag hunt geprägt. Diese einseitige Diät von Beispielen führt nach unserer Auffassung zu einem verzerrten Verständnis insbesondere von Verteilungskonflikten, weshalb wir vorschlagen, Asymmetrien der Auszahlungs‐ und Zugstruktur systematisch zu berücksichtigen. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird dementsprechend ein neues elementares Paradigma für Verteilungskonflikte als asymmetrische Spiele eingeführt. Diese werden numerisch illustriert und theoretisch diskutiert. Die Resultate einiger explorativer Experimente zur empirischen Seite der Angelegenheit werden ebenfalls skizziert. Conflit et coopération sociaux sont le plus souvent conçus en termes de jeux simples, non répétés, effectués deux par deux, symétriques et simultanés tels que le dilemme du prisonnier, ‘chicken’, assurance ou ‘stag hunt’. Il nous semble qu'un tel ensemble d'exemples donne une optique déformée notamment du conflit distributionnel. Nous proposons donc de tenir systématiquement compte de l'asymétrie des gains et des structures des jeux. Dans le présent article, nous introduisons un nouveau paradigme des conflits distributionnels comme jeux asymétriques, que nous soumettons à une illustration numérique et une analyse théorique. Est également présentée une ébauche de résultats expérimentaux pour démontrer l'aspect empirique.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony de Jasay & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Axel Ockenfels, 2004. "Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One‐Off Conflict," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 217-235, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:57:y:2004:i:2:p:217-235
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00251.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00251.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Beckenkamp & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2007. "Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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