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Common Agency and Partial Cooperation

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  • Siqueira, Kevin

Abstract

A modified common agency model is used to investigate the impact of partial cooperation on agent incentives. In the case where principals move simultaneously, it is shown that partial cooperation is self-defeating from the organizing principals' perspective despite a strengthening of agent incentives and effort. In the second scenario, where the organizing principals have a first-mover advantage, it is demonstrated that not only are individual cooperating principals better off but the outcome in terms of agent incentives and effort is constrained Pareto efficient. This latter scenario illustrates the possibility that partial cooperation, when coupled with a strategic advantage, improves efficiency. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Suggested Citation

  • Siqueira, Kevin, 2001. "Common Agency and Partial Cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 309-339.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:3:p:309-39
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    Cited by:

    1. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    2. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Kevin Siqueira & Todd Sandler, 2004. "Collective Goods, Common Agency, and Third-Party Intervention," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 1-20, January.

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