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Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Author

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  • David R. Collie

Abstract

Taxation under oligopoly is analyzed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximize the utility of their shareholders. Assuming that preferences are either identical and homothetic or identical and quasi‐linear, then the oligopoly model is an aggregative game, which greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of taxation. This novel analysis of taxation leads to a number of counterintuitive results that challenge conventional wisdom in microeconomics. A lump‐sum tax may increase the price of the oligopolistic good and decrease welfare whereas a profits tax may decrease the price of the oligopolistic good and increase welfare. A profits tax is shown to be superior to a lump‐sum tax. Furthermore, in line with conventional wisdom, total tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that leads to the same price for the oligopolistic good.

Suggested Citation

  • David R. Collie, 2019. "Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(4), pages 738-753, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:4:p:738-753
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12373
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    Cited by:

    1. Rabah Amir & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 765-771, October.
    2. Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review," EconomiX Working Papers 2025-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Ludovic A. Julien & Anicet Kabre & Louis de Mesnard, 2023. "Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?," Working Papers hal-04159849, HAL.
    4. Olivia Kay, 2024. "Cournot Duopoly with Cost Asymmetry and Balanced Budget Specific Taxes and Subsidies," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-10, August.
    5. Ludovic A. Julien & Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2024. "Pareto-Optimal Taxation Mechanism in Noncooperative Strategic Bilateral Exchange," Working Papers hal-04604299, HAL.
    6. Philipp J. H. Schröder & Allan Sørensen, 2021. "Specific taxation, asymmetric costs, and endogenous quality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1022-1051, October.
    7. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2019. "A strategic tax mechanism," MPRA Paper 93602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. TURCAN, Rina & TURCAN, Iuliu, 2020. "The Taxes’ Impact On The Entrepreneurial Activity Development," Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics, Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 8(1), pages 63-70, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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