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Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports

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  • ANNE BEYER
  • SRI S. SRIDHAR

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First, we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients, thus producing a stock price externality. Second, when the audit firm has limited wealth, an additional client can actually decrease the audit quality and increase the average likelihood of audit failure relative to a single‐client setting because of reporting externalities. Our analysis also demonstrates how requiring a more effective audit oversight mechanism can actually produce unintended consequences such as an increased likelihood of audit failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Beyer & Sri S. Sridhar, 2006. "Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 29-51, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:44:y:2006:i:1:p:29-51
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00197.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dye, Ronald A, 1993. "Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 887-914, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Corona & Ramandeep S. Randhawa, 2010. "The Auditor's Slippery Slope: An Analysis of Reputational Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(6), pages 924-937, June.
    2. Somdutta Basu & Suraj Shekhar, 2021. "What's In A Name? Reputation and Monitoring in the Audit Market," Working Papers 60, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    3. Mingcherng Deng & Tong Lu & Dan A. Simunic & Minlei Ye, 2014. "Do Joint Audits Improve or Impair Audit Quality?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(5), pages 1029-1060, December.
    4. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.

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