IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v53y2002i3p301-314.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Choice of Optimal Protection under Oligopoly: Import Tariff v. Production Subsidy

Author

Listed:
  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

Abstract

Economists researching the area of optimal protection have tended to analyse the ranking of alternative policy tools in the presence of perfect competition, either when the government in an importing country achieves a non‐economic target, or when there is a market distortion. Assuming international oligopolistic competition, I reconsider the choice of optimal policy instruments, i.e. an import tariff and a production subsidy. I show that the choice of optimal policy instruments depends on the relative number of home firms and foreign ones and on the magnitude of international cost differences. JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F13.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2002. "The Choice of Optimal Protection under Oligopoly: Import Tariff v. Production Subsidy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(3), pages 301-314, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:3:p:301-314
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00230
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00230
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-5876.00230?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:3:p:301-314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.