IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v51y2000i1p84-94.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Simple Model of Privately Profitable But Socially Useless Speculation

Author

Listed:
  • Murray C. Kemp
  • Hans-Werner Sinn

Abstract

The paper presents a general equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy with stochastic endowments, in which speculation in the forward market is profitable and stabilizes prices but is useless from a welfare point of view. Reconciling the Siegel paradox with the theory of incomplete markets, we show that banning speculation by closing the forward market may increase social welfare. We also show that the addition of a market might reduce the gains from international trade for all participating countries. JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F11, F19.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Murray C. Kemp & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2000. "A Simple Model of Privately Profitable But Socially Useless Speculation," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 84-94, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:84-94
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1468-5876.00140
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Edlin, Aaron S., 2002. "Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2wc1p9pw, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Cassing, James H. & Long, Ngo Van, 2021. "Trade in trash: A political economy approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Lars Hornuf & Lars Klöhn, 2019. "Do judges hate speculators?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 147-169, April.
    4. Edlin Aaron S., 2002. "Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-11, September.
    5. Marielle de Jong, 2011. "An adequate measure for exchange rate returns," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(2), pages 85-93, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:84-94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.