IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jbfnac/v28y2001i9-10p1115-1139b.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation

Author

Listed:
  • António Câmara

Abstract

Since 1995, more than 50 percent of the firms in the FTSE‐100 have granted rewards to their senior executives, the payoffs of which are contingent on the firm’s stock return relative to a bench mark return over a given period (hereafter, relative performance incentives). This paper investigates and derives closed‐form solutions for a class of relative performance incentives that have a positive payoff if, in addition to the traditional contingencies, the firm’s stock return is higher than the market return times a threshold. Results suggest that UK firms, in practice, when relative performance incentives (RPI’s) substitute absolute performance incentives (API’s) tend to (i) decrease the cost of their compensation packages; (ii) undertake more risky capital‐investment projects; and (iii) avoid providing so high‐powered incentives to increase shareholder wealth.

Suggested Citation

  • António Câmara, 2001. "The Pricing of Relative Performance Based Incentives for Executive Compensation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(9‐10), pages 1115-1139, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:28:y:2001:i:9-10:p:1115-1139:b
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.00410
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00410
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-5957.00410?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Fang & Tan, Weiqiang & Xin, Qingquan & Yang, Sixian, 2013. "How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 78-87.
    2. Yu Flora Kuang, 2008. "Performance-vested Stock Options and Earnings Management," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(9-10), pages 1049-1078.
    3. Kuang, Y., 2007. "Incentive effects of performance-vested stock options," Other publications TiSEM 18dd1758-4773-426f-98f3-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Chang, Chuang-Chang & Lin, Jun-Biao, 2010. "The valuation of contingent claims using alternative numerical methods," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 490-508, December.
    5. Yu Flora Kuang, 2008. "Performance‐vested Stock Options and Earnings Management," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(9‐10), pages 1049-1078, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:28:y:2001:i:9-10:p:1115-1139:b. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.