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Do Tighter Loan Covenants Signal Improved Future Corporate Results? The Case of Performance Pricing Covenants

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  • Mehdi Beyhaghi
  • Kamphol Panyagometh
  • Aron A. Gottesman
  • Gordon S. Roberts

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Suggested Citation

  • Mehdi Beyhaghi & Kamphol Panyagometh & Aron A. Gottesman & Gordon S. Roberts, 2017. "Do Tighter Loan Covenants Signal Improved Future Corporate Results? The Case of Performance Pricing Covenants," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 593-625, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:46:y:2017:i:3:p:593-625
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/fima.2017.46.issue-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Tang, Ning & Kamar, Amina & Lin, Chih-Yung & Lu, Chien-Lin, 2023. "Bank safety-oriented culture and lending decisions," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    2. Lim, Jesslyn & Do, Viet & Vu, Tram, 2022. "The effect of lenders’ dual holding on loan contract design: Evidence from performance pricing provisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    3. Chongyang Chen & Robert Kieschnick, 2024. "Bank competition and the design of syndicated loans," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 227-251, February.

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