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On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure

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  • NGO VAN LONG

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the enforcement of property rights by enclosing properties under common access is, in general, socially suboptimal: the timing of enclosure may be inappropriate, causing inefficiency. It is argued that the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics applies for a given collection of production sets, while enclosure implies a choice over collections of production sets

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  • Ngo Van Long, 1994. "On Optimal Enclosure and Optimal Timing of Enclosure," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 70(211), pages 368-372, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:70:y:1994:i:211:p:368-372
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1994.tb01855.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Long, Ngo Van, 2019. "Financing higher education in an imperfect world," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 23-31.
    2. Damien S Eldridge, 2008. "Sharing the greenhouse: Inducing cooperation in a global common," Working Papers 2008.07, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    3. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
    4. Hotte, Louis & Long, Ngo Van & Tian, Huilan, 2000. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-54, June.

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