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Politically Realistic Implementation With Inspection: The Equity‐Honesty‐Welfare Trade‐Off

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  • IGNACIO ORTUÑO‐ORTIN
  • JOHN E. ROEMER

Abstract

We study dominant strategy mechanisms where the planner knows the distribution of types and the agents are instructed to announce their types to the planner. It is assumed that the planner has access to a technology of inspection which is costly but perfect, and that he can penalize an agent who is inspected after announcements have been made if he is found to have lied about his type. It shall be shown that, in general, the welfare‐maximizing mechanism that respects minimal equity will induce some agents to lie about their types.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Ortuño‐Ortin & John E. Roemer, 1993. "Politically Realistic Implementation With Inspection: The Equity‐Honesty‐Welfare Trade‐Off," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 255-270, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:255-270
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1993.tb00078.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
    2. Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2005. "Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth," Microeconomics 0504008, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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