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A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers

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  • Malcolm B. Coate

Abstract

This paper tests a model of political control of the bureaucracy using a data set of mergers evaluated by the Federal Trade Commission between 1983 and 2000. The results support a sophisticated control model in which the President sets the agenda within the scope of policies acceptable to Congress. Changes in Presidential administration and in the composition of Congress can, but do not necessarily, affect merger policy. Instead, the shift in policy depends on how the institutions of the Presidency and Congress interact both in the previous and current periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm B. Coate, 2002. "A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:1:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00097
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    Cited by:

    1. Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, 2004. "Art of the Deal: The Merger Settlement Process at the Federal Trade Commission," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(4), pages 977-997, April.
    2. Mats Bergman & Malcolm Coate & Maria Jakobsson & Shawn Ulrick, 2010. "Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(4), pages 305-331, June.
    3. Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2007. "The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 455-489.
    4. Coate Malcolm B., 2006. "Economic Models and the Merger Guidelines: A Case Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 53-84, May.
    5. Malcolm B. Coate, 2013. "Unilateral Effects in Merger Analysis: Models, Merits, and Merger Policy," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(2), pages 145-162, July.

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