IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/corgov/v7y1999i1p3-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Governance: real power, Cecil King and Machiavelli

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth Simmonds

Abstract

Clauses in company articles giving boards rather than shareholders the power to remove directors, can give either the chairman or chief executive the power to retain their tenure even when performance is less than satisfactory. A power holder can simply remove opposition from a board as soon as it is expressed. When used ruthlessly, such power makes it almost impossible for independent non‐executive directors to carry out their most important role of monitoring executive directors and removing non‐performers at an early stage. Machiavelli claimed that extension of tenure was a prime cause of Rome’s decline. He argued persuasively for fixed terms, with no variation possible. The prohibition of removal clauses, and the introduction of fixed director terms might well increase corporate performance by preventing continued tenure for those who have failed.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Simmonds, 1999. "Corporate Governance: real power, Cecil King and Machiavelli," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 3-11, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:7:y:1999:i:1:p:3-11
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00123
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00123
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-8683.00123?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:7:y:1999:i:1:p:3-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.