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The Corporate Monitoring Firm

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  • Mark Latham

Abstract

Shareholders can gain effective control over their firm’s management by voting to choose an outside agency to nominate director candidates. This would give the board and management a greater incentive to serve the owners’ interests, resulting in higher productivity of capital, more realistic levels of executive pay, less short‐termism, and a moderation of the corporate bloat that tends to necessitate drastic cuts. Such a system would further improve corporate governance in western countries, and provide a much needed “quick fix” for governance problems in Asia.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Latham, 1999. "The Corporate Monitoring Firm," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 12-20, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:7:y:1999:i:1:p:12-20
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00124
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven Petra, 2007. "The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Informativeness of Earnings," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 129-152, February.

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