A General Characterization of Multiproduct Cournot Competition
The problem of oligopolistic competition between multiproduct firms is analysed using a general framework, where a given number of firms have access to the same technology, and play a Cournot game, by simultaneously choosing a quantity vector. Conditions guaranteeing the symmetry of the Cournot equilibrium are sought. The results obtained are very general, and can be given a straightforward natural economic interpretation, essentially requiring convexity of the cost function and the ruling out of pathological demand functions. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
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Volume (Year): 46 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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