The Politics of Social Pacts
The paper develops an analytical framework for the politics of negotiated voluntary wage restraint in the context of social pacts. It argues that, in contrast to earlier political exchanges, tripartite negotiations on wage restraint under restrictive economic policies are not based on a political exchange whereby governments had to compensate trade unions for wage restraint. Rather, governments can threaten trade unions with tight monetary policy and trade unions can either engage in negotiated adjustment or suffer restrictions. Social pacts are therefore an instrument of adjustment by governments to a new economic environment, and not a tool of economic policy. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2003.
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Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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