Nuclear Disarmament and the Erosion of Deterrence Effectiveness Case Study: Ukraine

The invasion of Ukraine demonstrates an interesting security paradox between nuclear disarmament norms, territorial integrity and deterrence in a self-help unpredictable international environment. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum in order to receive security guarantees resulting in brutal betrayal by nuclear armed Russia. The research investigates how Russia maintains an effective nuclear deterrence capability against other nuclear powers in the region through threats despite challenges on the battlefield. Through the combination of military resistance, strategic partnerships and robust combat methods, Ukraine has established an unmatched ability to deter a nuclear-armed enemy – Russia. This research ponders on nuclear coercion, deterrence and responsibility theory to analyze the double deterrence dynamic effects in real battleground scenario. The research investigates how Russian nuclear threats have transformed global power dynamics to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear capabilities as an essential deterrence strategy for protection against foreign threats. The case of Ukraine also demonstrates how a non-nuclear state can weaken nuclear deterrence capabilities by challenging its effectiveness thus, showing the limited effects in regard to nuclear coercion. The paper reveals that Russia’s deterrence strategies demonstrates a dynamic strategic advantage of its nuclear weapons in navigating complex international security environment. Meanwhile Ukraine’s defiance demonstrates a new approach to deterrence theory that questions the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. The research suggests an immediate review of nuclear proliferation norms and the duties of nuclear nations to maintain global security stability.