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The Auction Model with Lowest Risk in a Duopolistic Electricity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Estrella Alonso

    (Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería, Universidad Pontificia Comillas)

  • Gustavo Juan Tejada

    (Instituto de Matemática Interdisciplinar, Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Abstract

The present paper models the electricity market auction as a two-person game with incomplete information under the assumption that bidders are symmetric, risk neutral and have independent private costs. Alonso and Tejada (2010) define an extensive parametric family of auction models which contains the classic auction models; Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey auction models. The present paper analyzes this parametric family of auction models from the viewpoint of the risk. It develops a new auction model called DV, which has lower risk than any other classic auction model.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrella Alonso & Gustavo Juan Tejada, 2012. "The Auction Model with Lowest Risk in a Duopolistic Electricity Market," Económica, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 3-21, January-D.
    • Handle: RePEc:akh:journl:580
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    File URL: https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/Economica/article/view/5356/4871
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; Value at Risk; electricity market.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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