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Competition Policy and Concentration of a Globalized Retail Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Caprice
  • Vanessa von Schlippenbach

Abstract

During the last decades the face of retailing has changed as a result of an ongoing concentration process and the emergence of increasingly large-scale retail outlets. Retailers constitute, therefore, “strategic gatekeepers” to final consumer markets providing them with buyer power vis-à-vis their suppliers. By preventing market entry, existing retail regulations have further strengthened the dominant position of retailers. In order to overcome the potential abuse of buyer power and thus to circumvent the induced inefficiencies, competition among retailers has to be encouraged. This gains in importance since the retail sector is also characterized by a strong internationalization process affecting both the worldwide spread of retail companies as well as their procurement strategies. In this regard, downstream competition is the only way to compensate the missing global legislation and jurisdiction.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2008. "Competition Policy and Concentration of a Globalized Retail Industry," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 54(3), pages 183-202.
    • Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqaeq:v54_y2008_i3_q3_p183-202
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    buyer power; retail regulation; globalization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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