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Minimum Resale Price Maintenance and Concentrated Markets

Author

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  • Thibaud Vergé

Abstract

This paper reviews a recent strand of the literature on vertical restraints, that has focused on the anti-competitive effects of minimum (and fixed) resale price maintenance in settings with both inter- and intra-brand competition. In particular, we identify a set of situations with “interlocking relationships” (i.e. where manufacturers share common retailers) where RPM may be used to maintain retail prices at the monopoly level. We also discuss recent empirical studies that support the theoretical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Thibaud Vergé, 2008. "Minimum Resale Price Maintenance and Concentrated Markets," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 54(3), pages 161-182.
    • Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqaeq:v54_y2008_i3_q3_p161-182
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    Cited by:

    1. Xue, Weili & Caliskan Demirag, Ozgun & Niu, Baozhuang, 2014. "Supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(1), pages 130-145.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    resale price maintenance; interbrand and intrabrand competition; interlocking relationships;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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