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Substitutes for Success? Public versus Private Competition in Medicare Advantage

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Layton
  • Luca Maini
  • J. Michael McWilliams

Abstract

We assess the evolving role of competition in Medicare Advantage and its implications for beneficiary welfare. We describe how competition from the public option, traditional Medicare, and other private insurers within Medicare Advantage act as substitutes in incentivizing plans to deliver value. We show that while historically the choice between traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage provided a vital competitive dynamic, traditional Medicare's strength as a competitor has declined significantly, driven by generous payments favoring private plans. Consequently, the burden of ensuring value for enrollees has shifted to competition within the Medicare Advantage market. While county-level competition among private insurers has increased, this growth is primarily driven by the expansion of large national carriers rather than new entrants. Insurers still wield substantial market power due to significant barriers to entry, raising concerns about the ability of the program to incentivize private insurers to use public dollars to maximize value for beneficiaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Layton & Luca Maini & J. Michael McWilliams, 2026. "Substitutes for Success? Public versus Private Competition in Medicare Advantage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 143-170, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:40:y:2026:i:2:p:143-70
    DOI: 10.1257/jep.20251469
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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