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Government Trust and COVID-19 Vaccination: The Role of Supply Disruptions and Political Allegiances in Sierra Leone

Author

Listed:
  • Anbar Aizenman
  • Fatu E. Conteh
  • Rachel Glennerster
  • Samantha Horn
  • Desmond M. Kangbai
  • Anne Karing
  • Sarah Shaukat

Abstract

We use data on the universe of COVID-19 vaccines in Sierra Leone to examine the relationship between COVID-19 vaccination take-up and support for the party in power and whether interruptions to vaccine supply reduced take-up of second doses. We find that COVID-19 vaccine take-up is higher in areas that support the ruling party, but this mirrors long-term vaccination patterns and not the politicization of COVID-19 vaccines. People whose second dose was due just before and after a vaccine stockout had similar second take-up rates (around 50 percent)—that is, delayed access to second doses did not deter eventual take-up.

Suggested Citation

  • Anbar Aizenman & Fatu E. Conteh & Rachel Glennerster & Samantha Horn & Desmond M. Kangbai & Anne Karing & Sarah Shaukat, 2023. "Government Trust and COVID-19 Vaccination: The Role of Supply Disruptions and Political Allegiances in Sierra Leone," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 113, pages 647-652, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:113:y:2023:p:647-52
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231111
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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