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Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence

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  • Shanglyu Deng
  • Qiyao Zhou

Abstract

Recurring auctions are widely used to sell durable assets, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring auctions outperform single-round auctions when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency and revenue due to sorted entry of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences are characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure auctions in China reveal significant annual gains in efficiency (US$3.40 billion, 16.60 percent) and revenue (US$2.97 billion, 15.92 percent) using recurring auctions compared with single-round auctions. Implementing optimal reserve prices can further improve efficiency (3.35 percent) and revenue (3.06 percent).

Suggested Citation

  • Shanglyu Deng & Qiyao Zhou, 2026. "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 36-71, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:18:y:2026:i:4:p:36-71
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230303
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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